All Sympathies For Victims But Court Is Bound To Implement Law: Bombay HC In Pune Porsche Car Accident Case

In a very significant development, we see that the Bombay High Court in a latest judgment titled XYZ vs State of Maharashtra in Criminal Writ Petition No.2372 of 2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2024:BHC-AS:24700-DB that was pronounced finally on June 25, 2024 after reserving it on June 21 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has passed an order to release the minor accused in the Pune luxury car accident case that had claimed two lives into the care and custody of his paternal aunt. The Bombay High Court declared that the impugned remand orders that had been passed by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) was illegal and without jurisdiction and so was thus set aside. It must be noted that this pertinent verdict was passed by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Bharati Dangre and Hon’ble Justice Smt Manjusha Ajay Deshpande on an habeas corpus petition that had been filed by the minor’s aunt who is seeking the accused’s release from the observation home alleging that he was unlawfully and arbitrarily detained by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) in an observation home and which was allowed.

It would be worthwhile to note that the Bombay High Court directed that after the release, the minor must continue his session with the psychologist. It may be recalled that during the hearing last week, the Bombay High Court had questioned how the Juvenile Justice Board could have remanded the minor accused in the Pune Porsche accident case to an observation home when he had already been released on bail that had been granted to him on May 19 but was later remanded to an observation home. The Bench had very rightly remarked saying that the remand and its subsequent extension “completely nullified the effect of bail.”

It is most vital to note that the Bombay High Court criticized severely the “haphazard manner” in which the prosecution and law enforcement agencies handled the situation influenced by public outcry. To recapitulate, it was in the early hours of May 19, 2024 that the juvenile who is a 17-year-old son of a prominent Pune builder and who was allegedly driving a Porsche Taycan car at a very high speed in an inebriated state lost control when the vehicle had crashed into a bike that culminated in the killing of the two software engineers named Aneesh Awadhiya and Ashwini Koshta in Pune’s Kalyani Nagar. It was later found that the juvenile had been drinking at a pub with his friends just before the accident. It must be noted that the vehicle reportedly dragged one of the two persons on the bike and finally came to stop after hitting another two wheeler and a car.

At the very outset, this notable judgment authored by Hon’ble Ms Justice Bharati Dangre for a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court comprising of herself and and Hon’ble Ms Justice Manjusha Ajay Deshpande sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “In the early hours of 19.05.2024 a ghastly incident killed two young individuals in the city of Pune and the cause for the same happened to be Porsche car rashly driven by Master X, a child in conflict with law (hereinafter referred to as ‘CCL’). It is subsequently revealed during the investigation that the CCL was driving the vehicle under the influence of alcohol and the brand new car was being driven in a high speed, which resulted into its crash, after hitting a motorcycle with a pillion rider and this incident gathered huge attention state wide.”

To put things in perspective, the Division Bench envisages in para 2 that, “The alleged reckless act at the hands of the CCL resulted in registration of FIR bearing No.306/2024 for the offences under Section 304A, 279, 337, 338, 427 IPC and 184, 190 and 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act (Amendment Act 2019). A huge crowd gathered and the eye witnesses got their statements recorded about the manner in which the accident occurred, attributing rash and negligent act to the CCL and as an immediate reaction, he was held in captivity and had to face wrath of the public, who manhandled him. The CCL was apprehended and he being a juvenile (recorded age being 17 years and 8 months) was produced before Member No.I of Juvenile Justice B30oard, Pune and Application filed by his Advocate securing his release on bail was taken up for consideration. On the very same day i.e. on 19.05.2024, he came to be released on bail and we shall come to the said order and subsequent orders passed by the Board under the Juvenile Justice Act (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 (for short ‘Act of 2015’) read with Maharashtra State Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2018, a little later.”

Most brilliantly, the Division Bench propounds in para 3 that, “We must, however, take note of the haphazard manner in which the entire prosecution agency approached the issue, being rattled by the public outcry, as the entire Society was stunned by the impact of the incident, where two young innocent persons lost their lives and this is a classic case as to how the law enforcing as well as the law implementing agency reacted to the public outburst and treaded on a path of owing a moral responsibility of the CCL and his entire family, by alluding and questioning the upbringing of the the child belonging to the affluent family, by projecting their approach as having less regard to the lives of a common man on the road. Though at this stage it may be too early to record that the CCL was guilty of rash and negligent act, we are proceeding on the basis of the FIR, which accuse him of rash and negligent act, and the offence prima facie falling under the category of rash, reckless and negligent driving attracting Section 304A and the other provisions of the Indian Penal Code and, we, by any chance do not intend to go into the legality or otherwise of the penal provisions invoked in the subject FIR, nor are we any manner, have adverted to any subsequent action of the investigating agency, in registering subsequent offence against other members of the family. Though the manner in which the entire situation has been handled by the respondents including the investigation wing, we can only express our dismay and perturbation by describing the whole approach as an unfortunate incident and hope and trust that the future course of action to be chartered, shall be in accordance with existing provisions of law, avoiding any haste. However, at this stage, while pronouncing upon the the reliefs sought before us, in the Writ Petition we deem it necessary to discharge our solemn obligation, by adherence to the Rule of Law and we feel bound by it, though the respondents, the law enforcing agencies have succumbed to the public pressure, but we are of the firm opinion that the Rule of law must prevail in every situation, howsoever catastrophic or calamitous the situation may be and as Martin Luther King, has rightly observed, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”.”

Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 29 that, “When the power to release a child produced, is conferred on the Board, which comprise of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of First Class or Chief Executive Magistrate, a legally trained mind alongwith two social workers, who are entrusted with the responsibility of exercising the discretion of releasing a person on bail, being guided by the requisite parameters and once the CCL is released on bail, he is released from the custody of police, who had apprehended him, on account of his involvement in an alleged offence, either bailable or non-bailable, and his freedom is secured to him, awaiting his trial, though in certain circumstances, the order can be revoked and he can be referred in custody. However, without recalling the order passed by the Board, which had released him on bail, by invoking Section 104, and by justifying it on the pretext that the Board only placed him in an ‘Observation Home’, is an argument, which definitely contradicts the purpose with which he was released on bail i.e. set free, pending the inquiry/trial. The reference to the word ‘institution’ to which the child is to be sent under Section 104(1) is with reference to cases where bail is refused or not granted under sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 12 of the Act. Similarly the use of the words, ‘in whose care or supervision’ a child is to be placed is contained in subsection (1) of Section 104 is relatable to the words used in subsection (1) of Section 12, viz. a care of a person like a family member or the supervision of the Probation Officer. This would envisage only changing the order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 12, so as to alter only the person in whose care or the Probation Officer under whose supervision the child had been ordered to be placed and definitely would not cover a situation of remaining or restoring the child to a Observation Home, particularly when he is on bail and is entitled to be ‘free’.”

Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 30 that, “In passing the order dated 21.05.2024, the Board has thus misguided itself, by exercising the power under Section 104 and directing that the child will stay in Observation Home, though it has clarified that he continue to be on bail and if it was so, then he ought to be a free person, subject to the orders passed by the Board earlier i.e. on 19.05.2024, as it is the stand adopted by Respondents that the same is not cancelled, but only amended. Depriving the CCL of his freedom by confining him in the Observation Home, definitely runs contrary to its own order passed on 19.05.2024.”

It is worth noting that the Division Bench notes in para 31 that, “Pertinent to note that continuing with the same illegality, though being on bail, repeated applications are moved by the Investigating Officer before the Juvenile Justice Board at Pune, for extension of his detention in Observation Home, by further period of 14 days and surprisingly on the grounds of his release amounting to obstacle in progress of investigation or his further detention is necessasry in Observation Home for collection of additional evidence etc. The above grounds ought to have been pressed, when the question of releasing the CCL on bail was under consideration and to determine whether the CCL was entitled for his release on bail, and definitely not at the time when he is already a free man, on securing bail in his favour by a competent authority i.e. the Board, a statutory body constituted under the Act with the power conferred to released a child on bail or refuse the same, in exercise of the power under Section 12(1) of the Act of 2015.”

Most forthrightly, the Division Bench mandates in para 32 that, “The subsequent orders extending the Observation Home custody on two occasions, are the orders passed without jurisdiction, as without cancelling the bail, it is not permissible to remand him to any custody, when it may be even an Observation Home, there is no provision in the Act to adopt such a course. The Juvenile Justice Board has, therefore, clearly erred in assuming the power to detain the CCL in Observation Home, contradicting its own earlier order releasing him on bail, by construing its subsequent order, as amendment of the earlier order, which is a grossly erroneous assumption, as there is no question of confining a free child, who is already on bail. Reliance placed in the order, on Sections 3(iv), (vi), (vii) and (xiii), Section 12 and Section 104 of the said Act of 2015 and Rule 7 and 21 of the Maharashtra State Juvenile Justice (care and Protection of Children), Rules, 2018, as being the source of power to pass such an order is completely misplaced. Section 3 (iv), (vi), (vii) and (xiii) deal with general principles of, best interest of the child, safety of the child, positive natures, repatriation and restoration and reuniting with family. Whereas Rule 7 deals with the role and functions of the Board, while Rule 21 deals with procedure for rehabilitation. None of these provisions, let alone Sections 12 and 104, would authorize detention, in an Observation Home of a child who is on bail.”

Truly speaking, the Division Bench expounds in para 38 that, “In any case, by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act of 2015, the matters concerning apprehension, detention, prosecution, imposition of penalty and procedures and decisions or orders relating to rehabilitation, adoption, re-integration and restoration of children in need of care and protection, shall be governed by the provisions of the Act, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. In the absence of any provision in the Act of 2015 for remand of the child/juvenile, the procedure adopted by the Board in extending the remand of the CCL from time to time by 14 days, as contemplated under Section 167(2)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not applicable in case of a child who is already released on bail in exercise of powers under Section 12(1) of the Act of 2015.”

Most significantly, the Division Bench postulates in para 39 stating that, “Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum, a latin phrase, which connote, “Let justice be done though the heavens fall”, clearly convey a principle in law, that justice must be realized regardless of consequences and Just decisions may be made at whatever cost it comes. It is our bounden duty to prioritize justice above everything else, and definitely, we are not swayed away by the uproar created upon occurrence of the ghastly mishap, for which allegedly the CCL is personally responsible and which has resulted in loss of two innocent lives. We have all sympathies for the victim and their families but as a Court of Law, we are bound to implement the law as it stands. Law is an objective thing and there it stands, irrespective of whether it entails any hardship. Provisions of law must be applied equally to all and shall definitely treat everyone equally, as the dominant approach of doctrine of equality is equal justice, which would encompass equal protection of law. The administration of law should not degenerate into its choicest application in arduous and wary situations and it impermissible to have its inconsistent application, dependent upon who stands before us, and in what situation, justice is pleaded.”

Most courageously, while taking a very balanced stand, the Division Bench reiterates in para 40 holding that, “The outcry, as a knee jerk reaction to the accident, resulting into a clarion call of “see the accused’s action and not his age”, will have to be overlooked upon assimilating that the CCL is a child under the Juvenile Justice Act, being under 18 years and regardless of his crime, he must receive the same treatment, which every other child in conflict with law is entitled to receive, as the purpose of the Act of 2015 is to ensure that children who come in conflict with law are dealt with separately and not like adults. Though the accident caused by the CCL is the most hapless incident and a demand is made by the prosecution to accuse him of ‘heinous offence’ and try him as adult, which may receive due consideration as per law, we are bound by the scheme formulated by the legislature, for ensuring that all resources are mobilized including those of family and community, for promoting the well being of a children by facilitating their development and by providing an inclusive and enabling environment, to reduce the vulnerabilities they may face, and also the need for intervention under this Act, and, hence, we have permitted the benefit conferred by the special legislation, to be availed by the CCL, a child in conflict with law. For the aforesaid reason, we issue a writ of Habeas Corpus directing the release of the CCL from the Observation Home where he is detained, despite being released on bail by a validly passed order by the Board on 19/5/2024 forthwith. We also quash and set aside the impugned order dated 22/5/2024 and the subsequent orders dated 5/6/2024 and the order dated 12/6/2024, which have authorized the continuation of the CCL in the Observation Home which, according to us, is illegal, as the orders being without jurisdiction conferred on the Board.”

Finally and for clarity, the Division Bench then concludes by directing in para 41 that, “At this stage, we must however clarify that since the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child in the Society is a primary object of the Act of 2015 and because of the orders passed being in the Observation Home, if the CCL is referred to a Psychologist or undergoing therapies with the de-addiction centre, the same shall be continued with the CCL participating in these sessions on the given time and date, though he shall continue to remain in his home or any safe place, being on bail and the conditions imposed upon him by the order dated 19/5/2024 shall continue to govern him. In addition we also direct that the CCL shall continue to be under the supervision of the petitioner, his paternal aunt, who shall ensure the compliance of the necessary direction issued by the Board to assist him to be rehabilitated. The petition is therefore, made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b).”

So in the ultimate analysis, we thus see for ourselves that the Bombay High Court after taking into consideration all the facts before it and so also after perusing all the material that was placed on record found it totally appropriate to order the release of the minor accused in the Pune Porsche car accident case. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was most upright and candid in holding most elegantly, eloquently and effectively that, “We are bound by law, the aims and objectives of the Juvenile Justice Act and must treat him as any child in conflict with law separately from adult, despite the seriousness of the crime.” Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.